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OIL SPILL RESPONSE CAPACITY 
IN NUNAVUT AND THE BEAUFORT SEA
RESPONDING TO ARCTIC SHIPPING OIL SPILLS: RISKS AND CHALLENGES
As the Arctic warms and sea ice diminishes, the biggest threat to the Arctic marine 
environment from ships is from an oil spill. Less summer sea ice has already led to 
increases in ship traffic, yet significant legislative, capacity, information and funding 
gaps exist in the current spill response framework in both Nunavut, and in the 
Beaufort region. 
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Although the Canadian Coast Guard has developed 
national, regional, and area response plans, these 
plans rely on capacities and methods that may not 
exist or cannot be adapted in remote communities to 
respond to a ship-based spill. 
An Arctic shipping oil spill would devastate the 
surrounding marine environment, including the 
destruction of habitat for polar bears, seals, walrus, 
sea birds, as well as beluga, narwhal and bowhead 
whales. These consequences would be mainly borne 
by the communities, not the responsible parties.  
Arctic communities depend on healthy and clean 
waters for much of their food, and their cultural and 
spiritual well-being is tied to their environment. 
WWF-Canada commissioned a series of reports 
to identify barriers that will prevent northern 
communities from effectively responding to a ship-
based oil spill. Parallel reports for the western 
Beaufort region and Nunavut outline these barriers, 
and are summarized below. A third report provides a 
framework for developing realistic oil spill response 
plans for Nunavut communities. To effectively address 
the issues of oil spill response capacity in the North, 
engagement with communities is crucial to developing 
a framework that works within the Arctic context.
GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION
The reports focus on remote regions above the Arctic 
Circle in Nunavut and the Northwest Territories, 
where communities generally rely on a mixed 
subsistence and market economy. Many people 
spend time harvesting land and sea mammals to 
supply a significant portion of their diet. Traditional 
knowledge is passed from generation to generation, 
and is an important element of northern Indigenous 
culture. When the environment is disrupted, it 
will undoubtedly have a significant impact on 
communities. 
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BEAUFORT REGION
The Beaufort region includes more than 7,500 
kilometres of coastline. The area roughly corresponds 
with the Inuvialuit Settlement Region (ISR), one 
of the four Inuit regions of Canada. This region is 
also considered part of the southern route of the 
Northwest Passage.
In the Beaufort Region, the major communities are 
Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk, Aklavik, Paulatuk, Kugluktuk, 
Sachs Harbour and Ulukhaktok. The total population 
of the communities is 5,767 people, of which more 
than half are Inuvialuit.
NUNAVUT
This report focuses on the four northernmost 
communities in Nunavut. Above the Arctic Circle, 
much of Nunavut’s territory is a series of islands that 
make up the Arctic Archipelago. The largest of these 
is Baffin Island, which is home to the Mary River iron 
ore mine. All four communities are either on or close 
to the northern route of the Northwest Passage. 
The total population of the four Nunavut communities 
is just over 2,800 people, with more than half of 
those living in Pond Inlet, the closest community to 
the Mary River mine. The vast majority of Nunavut 
residents are Inuit. 
EXISTING ARCTIC SHIPPING OIL SPILL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK AND STANDARDS
The reports describe the framework that is in place to 
ensure that ships travelling through the Arctic have 
the capability to respond to an oil spill.  It shows that 
while there are plans and standards in place, there are 
also gaps and uncertainties.
NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL
•	 Canadian law requires ships to contract with 
a response organization that can provide 
equipment and personnel sufficient to clean 
up the amount of oil a ship is carrying, up to 
10,000 tonnes. However, ships travelling north 
of 60 degrees’ latitude are exempt from these 
provisions.
•	 Under Canadian and international law, all 
tankers over 150 tonnes and all other vessels 
over 400 tonnes must have a Ship Oil Pollution 
Emergency Plan (SOPEP), which includes 
reporting procedures, authorities to be contacted 
and actions to be taken. Currently, SOPEPs 
are not Arctic-specific and may not account for 
communications challenges that could arise in 
attempting to report a spill in the Arctic.
•	 Canada also has the National Marine Spills 
Contingency Plan, which includes a Central and 
Arctic Regional Plan that details the procedures, 
resources and strategies to be used in the event 
of spill.
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BEAUFORT REGION
The Canada/United States Joint Marine 
Pollution Contingency Plan includes a Joint 
Response Team for both countries to co-ordinate 
when necessary. It also sets out procedures for 
Arctic nations to notify and request assistance 
from each other in the event of a spill, and includes 
commitments to maintain a national oil spill response 
plan.
The Beaufort Sea and Amundsen Gulf Area 
Plan identifies specific geographical priority areas 
and proposes tactics to protect these areas in the first 
12 to 24 hours after a spill.
NUNAVUT
As part of the Nunavut Agreement, the North 
Baffin Regional Land Use Plan prohibits ships 
from coming within 10 kilometres of coastlines, and 
within 25 kilometres from the coastlines of Lancaster 
Sound, one of the most biologically productive areas 
of the Canadian Arctic. 
The Nunavut Land Use Plan is expected to be 
completed by the end of 2017. The 2016 draft of the 
plan identifies several other protected areas with 
seasonal restrictions to protect wildlife habitat such as 
sea ice crossings and calving grounds.
GAPS IN OIL SPILL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
Arctic conditions limit the effectiveness of response 
equipment and often prevent any response at all. The 
Arctic climate is defined by major seasonal changes 
and sea ice for nine out of every 12 months. Cold air 
temperatures persist for much of the year, with most 
communities experiencing at least 250 days below 
freezing. Rain, blowing snow, fog, gale-force winds 
and prolonged periods of darkness limit visibility. 
The presence of sea ice is the largest limiting factor in 
an adequate oil spill response. 
During the small window when a response would be 
possible, several other environmental factors would 
impede an adequate oil spill response:
•	 High waves and strong winds common to Arctic 
waters make it impossible to contain oil using 
a boom, a critical tool used to prevent oil from 
reaching the shoreline.
•	 If visibility is less than one kilometre, it is 
extremely difficult to find and recover oil slicks.
•	 Recovery cannot take place during darkness, 
which persists through most of the winter 
months.
•	 Response ships can become unsafe to operate 
due to ice buildup.
The type of oil used by the majority of ships, heavy 
fuel oil (HFO), is also extremely difficult to remove 
from the environment, even in ideal conditions.
EQUIPMENT
What Exists
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) is the primary 
source of spill response in the Arctic. Community 
packs containing basic equipment designed for small 
near-shore spills (up to one tonne of oil) have been 
placed in Resolute, Arctic Bay and Pond Inlet in 
Nunavut, and in Kugluktuk and Ulukhaktok in the 
Beaufort region. 
Both Iqaluit and Tuktoyaktuk have stockpiles of 
equipment, as does the Mary River Mine on Baffin 
Island. Additional oil spill resources are available 
from the CCG base in Hay River, south of Yellowknife.
Remnants of sea ice in late summer in Resolute Bay, Nunavut
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Capacity Limits
Inadequate equipment
The largest equipment available in the Arctic can 
recover up to 1,000 tonnes of oil. However, tankers 
carrying fuel to the Mary River Mine can carry up 
to 4,500 tonnes of diesel, and community resupply 
vessels carry up to 18,000 tonnes of fuel oil.
Maintenance
Maintenance of community packs has been 
inconsistent. The Arctic environment renders 
mechanical equipment inoperable if it isn’t properly 
maintained, so it is unknown whether the community 
packs are functional. 
Access
Assuming the equipment is functional, accessing 
it would be another challenge. Some communities 
don’t have a key for the locked storage containers 
because the CCG is concerned about maintaining 
responsibility for the equipment inside.
Transport to spill site
Even if the community can access the equipment, and 
it is functional, the small aluminum boats provided 
may not be sufficient to transport the equipment to 
the spill site in poor weather conditions. Larger boats 
better able to withstand harsh weather would then 
need to be located. 
If the spill occurred in a community without a pack, 
the hamlet would need to arrange for an airplane to 
deliver the equipment from a nearby community and 
transport it from the airstrip to the spill site. 
Storage and disposal
No hazardous waste facilities exist in the Arctic; 
all materials must be stored and transported 
south. Though response equipment in Iqaluit and 
Tuktoyaktuk is designed to recover up to 1,000 tonnes 
of oil, the containers in Tuktoyaktuk can only store 
up to 275 tonnes, with capacity in Hay River for an 
additional 240 tonnes. Oil cannot be removed from 
the environment if there is nowhere to store it.
People
The number of trained responders in northern 
communities is limited due to several factors. The 
communities are small, so there are only so many 
people to draw upon. In addition, people are often 
away from the community for long stretches, like 
during subsistence harvesting times, meaning a larger 
number would need to be trained to ensure there are 
always enough people available (anywhere from five 
to 16 community responders are necessary, depending 
on the equipment). 
Government funding for training is currently well 
below what is necessary to recruit and train an 
appropriate number of community members. And 
even if enough people could be found and trained, 
there is little opportunity to practise or maintain skill 
levels.
Finally, in the event of a large spill, many responders 
would need to be flown in from larger centres. Small 
communities will likely not have the resources to 
house, feed and support the influx of people. 
WWF staff and volunteers practising the use of a boom to catch oil spills on water at the NordNorsk Beredskapssenter 
in Fiskebol, a training centre where people learn how to clean up oil and gas spills in water and along the coast. Lofoten 
Islands, Nordland, Norway.
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Response Equipment Type Response Standard 
South of 60
Estimated Response 
Time North of 60
Oil spill up to 150 t Six hours 48 hours
Oil spill up to 1,000 t 12 hours One week
OTHER FACTORS THAT LIMIT RESPONSE
OIL SPILL BEHAVIOUR
Heavy fuel oil (HFO) is the fuel most often used by 
large shipping vessels. Of all the marine fuel options, 
it is also the most damaging in the event of a spill. The 
use of HFO is banned in the Antarctic, and several 
organizations (including WWF) are working with the 
International Maritime Organization to phase out the 
use of HFO in the Arctic.
The spreading and weathering of oil, and whether 
it comes in contact with ice, affects the way and the 
extent to which it can be recovered. Unfortunately, 
it is very difficult to conduct in-the-field research on 
how oil spills behave in the Arctic environment, so 
most of the information that exists is inferred from 
lab research.
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
Reliable communications infrasrtucture capable of 
providing information on weather and sea conditions, 
maintaining contact with on-the-ground and 
incoming responders, as well as being able to monitor 
the spill are all essential to an effective response. 
The community nearest to the spill would serve as 
an important communications hub. However, in the 
Arctic, cellphone and Internet networks are quickly 
overwhelmed, slowing Internet speeds, preventing 
phone calls, and potentially leading to a complete 
breakdown in emergency response protocol.
It is also critical for incoming responders to have 
information about safe maritime routes, including 
the presence of sea ice and inclement weather. If 
communications systems are inoperable, area surveys 
may be needed before vessels can assist, leading to 
more response delays.
RESPONSE TIME
Canadian law provides response times for different 
levels of spills, which must be adhered to by regional 
response organizations. However, these standards are 
not in line with current response capabilities in the 
Arctic:
If a CCG icebreaker was in the region, it could provide 
additional assistance, but there are only three ships 
responsible for the whole of the Northwest Passage. 
In 2008, the Baffin Regional Area Plan identified 
specific geographical priority areas (including 
Lancaster Sound) and proposed tactics to protect 
these areas in the first 12 to 24 hours after a 
spill. However, there are very few details or 
recommendations in the plan, and the CCG cautions 
that the strategies it outlines are untested and require 
an on-site assessment to confirm their validity.
A Canadian coast guard ship and a Russian converted research vessel carrying tourists in Resolute Bay, Qikiqtaaluk 
Region, Nunavut
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FOR MORE INFORMATION: 
Andrew Dumbrille 
Senior specialist, sustainable shipping, WWF-Canada 
(613) 232-2506 
adumbrille@wwfcanada.org
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build new ships and integrate lighter fuels into their 
business models.
4. Strengthen oil spill response plans
Response plans should be made Arctic-specific and 
address the logistical challenges of a spill response. 
Ships should be required by international and 
Canadian law to carry equipment for an initial 
response to a spill, and should have effective damage 
control measures in place to help mitigate the longer 
response times often encountered in the Arctic due to 
extreme weather.
5. Implement southern response standards in the North
Indigenous communities in the North should not 
receive a lower level of protection from spills simply 
because there are fewer ships in the region and 
communities are less populated. Standards for 
contracting with response organizations south of 60 
degrees’ latitude should also be implemented in the 
North.
6. Develop local capacity to respond to spills
The CCG should develop a list of trained individuals in 
each community, and incorporate training for oil spill 
response in schools and community organizations. 
Funding is also required to develop local training 
organizations and advisory boards, and to ensure 
Indigenous voices are heard in the decision-making 
process. Additional resources are also needed for 
oil recovery storage, response boats, harbours, boat 
ramps and on-shore response equipment.
7. Integrate Arctic-specific measures into Canada’s 
Oceans Protection Plan
Canada’s Oceans Protection Plan commits to 
improving Canada’s oil spill preparedness. The 
Government of Canada should commit to making the 
Arctic a top priority, and should be held accountable. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Shipping in the Canadian Arctic is a dangerous and 
precarious endeavour. Navigation is challenging, 
weather and visibility are often poor, sea ice is difficult 
to detect and the waters are inadequately charted. 
Yet, as sea ice melts, shipping is only increasing in the 
region, along with the risk of oil spills that threaten 
the sensitive Arctic ecosystem and the wildlife and 
communities that depend on it. 
The extreme Arctic climate makes a successful oil 
spill response enormously challenging, even with 
unlimited personnel and equipment. However, there 
are several measures that could provide added safety 
and reduce the risk of spills, as well as increasing 
response capabilities:
1. Incorporate Inuit organizations into the Northern 
Marine Transportation Corridors Initiative
Inuit and Inuvialuit should have a greater role in 
decision-making that shapes the future of Arctic 
shipping. The Northern Marine Transportation 
Corridors Initiative is a CCG and Transport Canada 
program tasked with identifying specific shipping 
routes through the Arctic to improve safety. Arctic 
Indigenous peoples should be fully incorporated into 
this process. 
2. Increase preventative measures
Shipping lanes should be identified using information 
on subsistence use and environmentally sensitive 
habitats. Transport Canada should then designate 
preferred routes, as well as areas to be avoided, and 
take these routes and areas to the International 
Maritime Organization.
3. Eliminate the use of heavy fuel oil in the Arctic
The Government of Canada, under the jurisdiction 
of Transport Canada, should implement a ban on 
HFO through national legislation, with a phase-out 
period to allow industry and re-supply vessels time to 
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I. Introduction: the need for local response planning 
The purpose of this report is to provide background information to support a process 
for community oil spill response planning in Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Resolute, and 
Grise Fiord.   
Diminishing sea ice in the Arctic has led to increased shipping, which in turn leads 
to an increase in the risk of spills from ships.1 The biggest threat to the Arctic 
marine environment from ships is from an oil spill.2 Yet, significant legislative, 
capacity, information and funding gaps exist in the current spill response framework 
in Nunavut. Although the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) has developed national, 
regional, and area response plans, the plans rely on capacities and methods that 
may not adequately protect the hamlets in Nunavut from a ship based spill. 
The impacts of a spill would be borne by the communities in the region, who depend 
on healthy and clean marine waters for the majority of their food and whose cultural 
and spiritual well-being are tied to their environment. Despite the severe 
consequences of a spill to local communities, the people in the Nunavut region have 
had insufficient input into oil spill response planning in their waters.  
A meaningful role in oil spill response planning by Nunavut communities is 
important, because it is likely that in many cases, they would be the first responders 
on scene to respond to oil spill, and they have the deepest understanding of the 
environmental conditions and the sensitive resources that would influence response 
                                                 
1 Ellis, B. and Brigham, L., co-editors, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report (Arctic 
Council, 2009), p. 168. 
2 Id., p. 5. 
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operations. Thus, oil spill response can be strengthened through better coordination 
with local communities.3 Such participation would also support the constitutional 
right of Aboriginal engagement in decision-making for issues that could significantly 
impact their land, culture, and health.  
Not every community has response equipment for a marine spill. In the 
communities that do, the equipment is limited and could be used to respond to only 
a very small spill. This equipment is not regularly checked and there is a strong 
possibility that some of it will not be functional unless it is repaired and replaced on 
a regular basis. Furthermore, the local plans do not provide much detail on priority 
places or describe how the response equipment can be used to protect those 
places. The response plans identify equipment that could be brought in from 
outside these communities, but the plans do not identify or address the logistical 
challenges that would be involved in cascading additional people and equipment 
and thus do not acknowledge the low likelihood that more resources could be 
brought in to effectively limit the impacts of a spill.  
Ships oil spill response plans provide no guidance for cleaning up a spill in the water 
and ships carry no response equipment for marine spills. Although the Mary River 
Mine has spill response plans, these plans are designed only for a small spill in the 
immediate area of the Milne Point port. 
Response planning standards are requirements that determine how much oil a 
response plan should be designed to recover and how quickly that recovery should 
take place. In the south, these standards apply to private Response Organizations, 
which ships must contract with to provide response capacity. However, the 
standards are not based on an assessment of the amount of oil that could spill in a 
worst-case discharge. In the Arctic, there are no Response Organizations and 
equipment and capacity is thus developed on an ad hoc basis, again without any 
reference to the amount of fuel that could actually be spilled 
Thus, there is little response equipment throughout the Arctic. The great distances 
between equipment depots, the sparse infrastructure, and the challenging weather 
conditions would make it very difficult to transport equipment and people from one 
location to another, and these challenges would be compounded when trying to use 
equipment and people from the south to respond to a spill in the Arctic. 
Even if a community has sufficient equipment and trained personnel, there are a 
number of factors that can limit an effective spill response. For example, the 
spreading and weathering of oil and whether it comes into contact with ice will 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., A Review of Canada’s Ship-Source Spill Preparedness and Response: Setting the Course 
for the Future, Phase II, Tanker Safety Expert Panel (2014); LOOKNorth, Oil Spill Detection and 
Modeling in the Hudson and Davis Straits (May 2014).  
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significantly affect recovery success. The equipment that is used to recover oil or 
protect the shoreline will not work as well in certain situations, such as where there 
are high winds, short period or high waves, limited visibility, or icy waters. The ability 
for people to communicate between the spill sites, the staging area where 
equipment is located, the nearest hamlet, and boats and aircraft in the area is also 
important, as is the ability for people and equipment to get to the spill site. All of 
these things can affect the time it takes to respond to a spill, and the more time 
that passes, the more difficult it becomes to recover oil or protect important 
resources before the oil encounters them.  
The existing state of preparedness in the Arctic strongly points to the need for and 
fundamental importance of developing a local response capacity. The development 
of this capacity can build on the regulatory framework relating to land and water 
use, the protection of environmental and cultural resources, and oil spill 
preparedness and response. This framework involves a range of individuals, 
companies, and government entities that can be engaged to support community-
based response planning and the development of stronger legal standards.  
Most importantly, however, a community response plan can identify local priorities 
and provide leadership and direction for all entities engaged in developing Arctic oil 
spill response capacity. 
II. Background  
The location, physical environment, infrastructure, and population of a community 
are important initial considerations in identifying options for strengthening a 
community’s capacity for oil spill response. These underlying factors create 
constraints that community response planning must take into account.   
Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Resolute, and Grise Fiord are the four northern-most 
communities in Canada and are part of the territory of Nunavut, in the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago. Grise Fiord, the northern-most community, is on Ellesmere 
Island, which is part of the Canada’s far north Queen Elizabeth Islands. Resolute, 
the second most northern hamlet, is on Cornwallis Island, west of Ellesmere Island 
and also part of the Queen Elizabeth Islands. To the south, Lancaster Sound 
separates the Queen Elizabeth Islands from Baffin Island, which is home to Pond 
Inlet and Arctic Bay. Lancaster Sound leads from Baffin Bay west into Parry 
Channel, forming the eastern portion of the Northwest Passage. Thus, each of these 
communities is on or near the emerging shipping routes connecting the Atlantic and 
Pacific Oceans through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. 
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Physical Environment 
The extreme climate of Nunavut includes major seasonal changes and sea ice for 
much of the year. Baffin Bay is frozen from October until June, with landfast ice in 
all the fjords and pack ice offshore persisting late into the summer. Even during the 
open water season, icebergs, calving from tidewater glaciers in Greenland and 
Canada, are frequent along the entire coast. Much of the shoreline along Baffin Bay 
consists of cliffs 1000 metres high. The many fjords and inlets in the region are 
deep water, between 200 and 500 metres, and the tidal range is generally less than 
a metre.4 
Lancaster Sound is also chocked with pack ice and landfast ice for nine months of 
the year. The coast has cliffs reaching 400 metres high interspersed with coastal 
plains and many fjords and inlets. The tidal range is around two metres and there is 
a moderate current through the Sound. 
Arctic Bay, Grise Fiord, and Pond Inlet are adjacent to polynyas, which are nutrient-
rich areas of open water throughout the year that provide important habitat for 
many species of marine mammals. The largest is the North Water Polynya in 
northern Baffin Bay. 
In addition to the sea ice, cold air temperatures also characterize the area for much 
of the year. From December until April, the average daily temperature is 22 degrees 
Celsius below zero. Temperatures go above freezing only during June, July, and 
August, but even during this warmer period daily averages are only slightly above 
freezing. Clouds, fog, blowing snow and darkness often limit visibility in the region.  
Infrastructure and population5 
The Nunavut region is sparsely populated and difficult to reach. The communities of 
Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Resolute, and Grise Fiord are predominately Inuit 
(Nunavummiut) who rely on a mixed subsistence and market economy. Many 
people hunt and fish for a significant portion of their diet. The environmental 
knowledge and survival skills required by these activities are important elements of 
Nunavummiut culture, passed down from generation to generation.  
The communication and transportation infrastructure in the Nunavut region is 
minimal. No roads lead into or out of the communities. Small planes using gravel 
airstrips and small docks or boat ramps serve as the primary mode of 
transportation for the communities. Local travel is mostly by snow machines and 
ATVs on dirt roads. Travel beyond the local roads on the tundra is difficult in the 
summer but possible on the snow and ice during the winter. Internet and telephone 
                                                 
4 Canadian Coast Guard, Baffin Region, Nunavut Area Plan (2008). 
5 Demographics and infrastructure information from Government of Nunavut website.  
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bandwidth, which is offered through satellite connections, is low and inconsistent, 
and there is limited VHF coverage offshore. 
Large vessels bring supplies to the hamlets during the summer and must remain 
offshore, transferring the goods to shallow draft barges and landing craft that land 
on the beach. No hazardous waste facilities exist in the entire region. This means 
that ships must keep any hazardous materials onboard until they reach a facility in 
the south. In addition, when oil is recovered from a spill, it cannot be disposed of 
locally but must be stored and shipped to the south.  
Climate Change 
As part of the region where multi-year ice is expected to persist the longest, the 
communities of Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Resolute, and Grise Fiord are experiencing 
fewer effects of climate change than many other Arctic communities. However, 
even in this “Last Ice Area,” Inuit hunters have experienced changes in freeze-up 
and break-up timing, less stable sea ice, and changes to ocean currents and 
temperatures. Although the open water season is extending, large pieces of glacier 
are breaking off and traveling through the waterways.6 All of Canada’s northern 
coasts have warmed more than the Canadian average. 7 Annual precipitation has 
increased, and is projected to continue to increase during all seasons, especially 
winter.8 Winds are increasing as well. 
The changes in the climate are altering ecosystems that have supported traditional 
Inuit activities and life for centuries.9 Ice-based travel routes and hunting grounds 
are becoming unsafe and inaccessible during shoulder seasons and animal 
migration times and locations are changing, making subsistence hunting more 
difficult.10  
The North Water Polynya has been breaking up earlier and occurring less frequently 
over the last four decades. Changes to this and associated polynyas will also affect 
subsistence hunters, particularly those in Grise Fiord, who rely heavily on the 
polynyas to hunt for whales and other marine mammals that concentrate there.11 
Conversely, some environmental resources are increasing. For example, a projected 
                                                 
6 Petrasek MacDonald Consulting, Impacts of Current and Projected Climate Change on Key 
Features of the Last Ice Area, p. 9 (July 2016) [hereinafter Impacts on LIA]. 
7 Lemmen, D., et al, editors, Canada’s Marine Coasts in a Changing Climate, p.166 (Government of 
Canada, 2016).  
8 Impacts on LIA, p. 6; Canada’s Marine Coasts in a Changing Climate, p. 166. 
9 Unikkaaqatigiit: Putting The Human Face On Climate Change, p. 4(Tapiriit Kanatami, Université 
Laval, and National Aboriginal Health Organization, 2005).  
10 Impacts on LIA, p. 28. 
11 Id., p. 16. 
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growth in Arctic cod will likely bring benefits to subsistence and the economy, 
especially for Arctic Bay and Resolute.12 
 
III.  Regulatory framework and entities responsible for marine 
activities, oil spill preparedness and response, and environmental 
protection in Nunavut  
Community-based oil spill response can involve the participation and input of a 
range of individuals, companies, and government entities. The regulatory 
framework relating to land and water use, the protection of environmental and 
cultural resources, and oil spill preparedness and response identifies the legal 
requirements that are related to preparedness and response and the entities that 
can be engaged to support community-based response planning.  
Governance of land and water use 
The Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) was negotiated by the Nunavut 
Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) and the federal government of Canada and created 
the public government of Nunavut, a territory of Canada. The NLCA identifies the 
geographical and governing jurisdiction of the territorial government, which includes 
all lands and waters within the Nunavut Settlement Area.13  
The NLCA provides the overarching policy direction for the development and review 
of land use plans in Nunavut, which guide development in Nunavut, including in 
marine areas.14 Land use plans are relevant to community oil spill response 
because they identify priority uses and important areas, and they govern activities, 
including shipping, that entail oil spill risks in marine waters. Conditions imposed by 
the plan can help to address existing oil spill risks as preventative measures. In 
addition, should specific projects in the future entail addition risks, the approval of 
those proposals can be conditioned on actions that may support the necessary 
increase in response planning capabilities. 
The North Baffin Regional Land Use Plan, approved in 2000, includes the 
communities of Resolute, Arctic Bay, Grise Fiord, and Pond Inlet.15 The plan requires 
regular meetings between the CCG and the communities to discuss shipping-related 
concerns, prohibits ships from coming within 10 kilometres from coastlines 
generally and within 20-25 kilometres from the coastline of Lancaster Sound unless 
they are approaching or leaving a port, and calls for the minimization of ships 
                                                 
12 Id., p. 19-20. 
13 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) Section 3.2.1. 
14 Id., Section 11.5.1 & 15.2.2. 
15 Nunavut Planning Commission, North Baffin Regional Land Use Plan (2000). 
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traveling through and around ice floe edges.16 It is unclear whether ship traffic is 
actively monitored to ensure compliance with these setbacks.  
The Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC) is in the process of creating the Nunavut 
Land Use Plan (NLUP), which is scheduled to be complete in 2017. The NLUP 
applies to all activities within Nunavut, including the Outer Land Fast Ice Zone 
(along Baffin Bay), surface and subsurface lands, freshwater, marine areas and the 
beds of these bodies of water. The NLUP does not apply within established National 
Parks, National Marine Conservation Areas, Territorial Parks, and National Historic 
Sites administered by Parks Canada. Although none of these areas are within the 
communities discussed in this report, some are adjacent to or near them, and Parks 
Canada may therefore be a valuable partner in developing community response 
plans. 
The 2016 draft NLUP sets out broad goals, which include protecting and sustaining 
the environment, encouraging conservation planning, building healthier 
communities, and encouraging sustainable economic development. In support of 
these goals, the draft plan identifies options and recommendations for restricting or 
prohibiting specific uses of land and water. The draft plan also provides one of three 
land use designations for all areas covered by the plan: protected areas, special 
management areas, and mixed use areas. Some protected areas and special 
management areas, especially in marine waters, have seasonal restrictions. For 
example, shipping is restricted in certain times and places to allow caribou crossing 
on the ice and to protect beluga calving grounds. Subject to these seasonal 
restrictions, shipping is allowed in most areas although there are some set backs to 
protect important ecological resources. In addition, communities have listed two 
areas as being essential for a variety of ecological purposes, and have asked that 
these locations be closed to all non-Inuit vessels.17 
The NPC implements land use plans by conducting Conformity Determinations for 
projects, and conditions accompanying those determinations are implemented 
through the issuance of permits, licenses, and authorizations. Under Article 11 of 
the NLCA, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (INAC) can grant 
an exemption from a decision by the NPC that a project is not in conformity with the 
NLUP.18 For example, the Minister of INAC granted an exemption for the Mary River 
Mine Project, an iron ore mine that has recently begun production. However, 
                                                 
16 Id. Terms 3.5.3 to 3.5.5. 
17 The two areas are Moffatt Inlet (near Arctic Bay) and Foxe Basin (south of the communities 
discussed in this report). 
18 NLCA Section 11.5.11. 
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whether the exemption still applies under the new federal administration, and 
whether the exemption applies to the mine’s recently revised plans, is unclear.19 
After the Conformity Determination, the NPC forwards the project proposal to the 
Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB), which reviews project proposals and 
determines whether projects should proceed, and if so, under what terms and 
conditions.20 Thus, for specific projects, the NIRB may also impose terms and 
conditions that support community response planning. For example, the NIRB 
imposed specific conditions regarding fuel storage for the Crystal Serenity cruise 
ship.21 
Certain activities are exempt from review by the NIRB, including shipping for 
community resupply, unless the NPC has concerns about cumulative impacts.22 
However, shipping activity for other projects are not exempt from review by the 
NIRB.23 Projects that have been exempted from the NLUP by a Minister (e.g., of 
INAC) must still undergo review by the NIRB. 
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act is one of the primary federal laws 
governing shipping activity in Canada. The Act prohibits pollution from ships and 
creates shipping safety control zones that limit entry based on the polar class of the 
vessel, according to ice conditions in the zone. Under the Canada Shipping Act, 
ships that are more than 300 gross tonnes (GT) must report their geographic 
position under the Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone (NORDREG) before 
entering Canada’s northern waters.  
Protection of wildlife and Aboriginal interests 
Various Aboriginal and public government institutions play a role in the governance 
of wildlife and Aboriginal interests.  
This section will first discuss Aboriginal institutions. NTI represents Inuit under the 
NLCA, acting as a watchdog to ensure provisions under the agreement are carried 
out. Under the umbrella of NTI, the three regions of Nunavut are represented by 
different Regional Inuit Associations. Pond Inlet, Resolute, Grise Fiord and Arctic 
Bay are part of the Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA). As a “Designated Inuit 
Organization” under Article 39 of the NLCA, QIA is responsible for managing Inuit 
Owned Lands (which are solely terrestrial) in the Qikiqtani Region. There are Inuit 
Owned Lands near the communities of Pond Inlet, Resolute, Grise Fiord and Arctic 
                                                 
19 “Nunavut regulator: we can’t assess Baffinland’s new railway proposal,” Nunatsiaq Online, July 26, 
2016.  
20 NLCA Section 12.2.2; 12.3.1. 
21 Nunavut Impact Review Board, Screening Decision Report File No.: 16TN039 (Aug. 23, 2016).  
22 NLCA Section 12.3.3. 
23 Id., Section 12.12.2. 
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Bay.24 QIA’s Department of Major Projects serves as a source of information about 
major projects and advocates on behalf of Inuit, including through Impact Benefit 
Agreements with project proponents such as Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation.25 
The national umbrella group for Inuit Organizations is Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK). 
 
The NLCA also created Inuit wildlife organizations.26 The Nunavut Inuit Wildlife 
Secretariat represents territorial wildlife issues and supports the Regional Wildlife 
Organizations (RWO) and Hunters and Trappers Organizations (HTOs).27 Qikiqtaaluk 
Wildlife Board is the RWO for Grise Fiord, Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, and Resolute. Each 
community has its own HTO. These organizations can help identify priority areas for 
community protection, contribute information about logistical concerns, play a role 
in the protection of wildlife during a spill, and advocate for additional support to 
protect Inuit wildlife resources in response planning.  
Turning to public government, within the Government of Nunavut, the Department 
of Environment’s Divisions of Wildlife Management, Fisheries and Sealing, and 
Parks and Special Places manage and protect important wildlife and habitat. Each 
of these divisions may have valuable expertise to contribute to the development of 
local response plans. 
The Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) was created as an institution of 
public government under the NLCA, and is the main instrument of wildlife 
management and the main regulator of access to wildlife in the Nunavut 
Settlement Area. The Board’s mandate is to help ensure the protection and wise 
use of wildlife and wildlife habitat for the long-term benefit of Inuit and the rest of 
the public of Nunavut and Canada.28 The federal government’s Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans co-manages these resources through its participation on the 
NWMB. 
The Nunavut Marine Council (NMC), also established under the NLCA, is comprised 
of the NIRB, the Nunavut Water Board, the NPC and the NWMB and advises and 
makes recommendations to other government agencies regarding the marine areas 
of the Nunavut Settlement Area.29  
At the federal level, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) oversees 
resource conservation, protection of water resources, and weather forecasting. The 
ECCC’s National Environmental Emergencies Centre (NEEC) coordinates ECCC’s role 
                                                 
24 Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, Inuit Owned Lands in Nunavut (2000).  
25 Qikiqtani Inuit Association, Department of Major Projects.  
26 NLCA Sections 5.2.1, 5.7.1. 
27 Nunavut Inuit Wildlife Secretariat. 
28 NLCA Section 5.2.33. 
29 Nunavut Marine Council Business Case (Feb. 2012). 
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in environmental emergency preparedness and response for both land and marine 
incidents. NEEC provides scientific advice, including contaminant dispersion and 
trajectory modeling, fate and behavior of hazardous substances, oil sensitivity 
mapping data, and the establishment of cleanup priorities and techniques. The 
Centre also oversees the protection of sensitive ecosystems and wildlife such as 
migratory birds and fish. Thus, NEEC provides environmental information to inform 
the CCG’s planning for and response to a spill. 
 
The Canadian Wildlife Service, which is part of NEEC, provides advice on wildlife 
protection, rescue and rehabilitation. In the event of a spill, the agency would also 
issue permits for wildlife hazing and capture, if necessary. The agency has issued 
response plan guidance for oiled birds but has no wildlife treatment capabilities.30 
These are typically provided by a third-party contractor hired at the time of a spill. 
Governance of oil spill preparedness and response  
The regulatory framework for oil spill preparedness and response includes 
jurisdiction by various government agencies at the territorial and federal level. The 
Government of Nunavut is responsible for ensuring preparedness and response for 
land-based spills and spills that occur along Nunavut’s coastlines. The Department 
of Environment’s (DOE) Environmental Protection Division enforces Canada’s Spill 
Contingency Planning and Reporting Regulations, which require spill contingency 
plans for fuel handling and storage facilities.31 The regulations require an inventory 
and the location of response and clean up equipment available to implement the 
spill contingency plan but they do not specify how much or what kinds of equipment 
must be included in the plan, nor whether marine or shoreline protection and clean 
up equipment must be on hand. Nunavut’s Petroleum Products Division (PPD) has 
recently updated oil spill response and environmental emergency plans for all of the 
communities in Nunavut. These plans outline response techniques, including for the 
containment of fuel in water and in ice.32 The plans also provide an inventory of 
dedicated facility spill response equipment. For each of the communities, the 
equipment list is as follows:33 
                                                 
30 Canadian Wildlife Service, Birds and Oil - Response Plan Guidance (Draft June 2012). 
31 Environmental Protection Act, Consolidation Of Spill Contingency Planning and Reporting 
Regulations R-068-93 (July 22, 1993). 
32 See, e.g., Petroleum Products Division, Grise Fiord Environmental Emergency Plan, pp. 101 – 104 
(plan effective from September 28, 2015). 
33 See, e.g., Grise Fiord Oil Pollution Emergency Plan, p. 29 (plan effective from September 1, 2015). 
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The DOE has a conservation officer in every hamlet and a Regional Environmental 
Protection Officer in Pond Inlet, and they receive a 4-day spill response course that 
focused on land-based spills but touches on marine spills.34 
At the federal level, Transport Canada (TC) is the lead agency regulating Canada’s 
Marine Oil Spill Preparedness and Response regime. TC sets the guidelines and 
regulatory structure for the preparedness and response to marine oil spills and is 
responsible for ensuring that the appropriate level of preparedness is available to 
respond to marine oil pollution incidents in Canada.  
Pursuant to the Emergency Management Act, the CCG develops and maintains the 
national, regional, and area oil spill response plans, which must conform to the 
guidelines and regulations set out by TC. The National Marine Spills Contingency 
Plan (National Response Plan) outlines the responsibilities of various entities. South 
of 60 degrees, the operators of a ship are responsible for responding to a spill and 
are required to contract with a Response Organization that supplies the equipment 
and personnel to conduct the response.35 In the Arctic, there are no Response 
Organizations and the CCG is the primary entity responsible for managing and 
carrying out a spill response.36 The CCG and the Government of Nunavut have 
overlapping responsibilities regarding the protection and cleanup of shorelines. 
While TC and CCG are primarily responsible for oil spill preparedness and response, 
other entities also provide input into policy or assistance with preparedness and 
response. For example, the Arctic Regional Advisory Council is comprised of 
representatives from local government, Aboriginal interests, the fishing industry, 
commercial shipping, conservation groups, and others. The Advisory Council has the 
mandate to make recommendations to the Ministry of Transport on policy issues 
                                                 
34Nunavut Department of Environment, comments on Phase II of Tanker Safety Expert Panel (May 
16, 2014).  
35 Canada Shipping Act, 2001, section 171. 
36 Oceans Act, 1996, section 41(1). 
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affecting regional preparedness and response.37 Although the Advisory Council 
could provide future guidance for local oil spill response planning, it is unclear how 
active or authoritative the Advisory Council is at this point.38 The Northwest 
Territories/Nunavut Spills Working Group is an inter-agency group that provides 
coordination for spill reporting and response. Finally, The Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) has detachments in all four communities and has provided initial 
reconnaissance about marine spill locations in advance of the arrival of responders. 
The RCMP may also have the keys to access to the CCG’s response equipment that 
is stored in the communities.39 
Oil spill response plans 
The CCG has developed a series of response plans that are designed to work 
together, going from a national, to regional, to local level. At the highest level, the 
National Response Plan sets out overarching policies, guidelines, and 
responsibilities for oil spill response operations and it requires each CCG response 
region to detail the procedures, resources, and strategies that will be used to 
respond to a spill.40  
More detailed Regional Plans identify the inventories of response equipment and 
provide additional explanation of how response will take place. The Central and 
Arctic Regional Plan covers all Canadian waters from the Alaska-Yukon boundary 
east to the Nunavut-Greenland boundary, as well as Hudson and James Bays, the 
Great Lakes, the St. Lawrence River, and the internal waters of Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario.41 This plan 
details the procedures, resources, and strategies that will be used for a response in 
the region. However, there is no process in place that assures that the equipment 
requirements of these plans are in place or that the CCG is prepared to respond 
effectively.42 Thus, certain aspects of the plan are aspirational and do not reflect the 
existing state of planning and preparedness. For example, the Area Response Plan 
provides an inventory of equipment, but there are no processes or procedures in 
place to ensure that the equipment is in working order. The plan also provides for 
cascading of additional equipment from other locations in the event of a spill that 
exceeds the capacity of the equipment in the community, but there is no 
                                                 
37 Canada Shipping Act, 2001, section 172. 
38 Although the Tanker Safety Panel’s second report, which addresses Arctic shipping, did not 
reference Regional Advisory Councils, the first report recommended that they be disbanded. 
39 Oil Spill Detection and Modeling in the Hudson and Davis Straits, p. 65. 
40 Canadian Coast Guard, Marine Spills Contingency Plan – National Chapter (2011), pp. 1-6 to 1-7. 
41 Canadian Coast Guard, Central and Arctic Regional Response Plan (2008), p. 1-1. 
42 Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development to the House of 
Commons, Chapter 1, Oil Spills from Ships (Office of the Auditor General, 2010), p. 2 [CESD Oil Spills 
from Ships]. 
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requirement to ensure that this equipment could actually be transferred to the site 
within a useful period of time.  
At a more local level, the Area Plans, which are annexes to the Regional Plans, are 
to be based on risk analysis (determining which communities or areas are most 
likely to be endangered by a potential oil spill and why, their associated 
environmental sensitivities, and the typical type of spill that could be expected), the 
identification of response priorities, and the development of response strategies 
and tactics.43 These plans are supposed to be reviewed and updated annually.44 
The Baffin Region Area Plan, drafted in 2008 (and not updated since then), covers 
Foxe Basin, Hudson Strait, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Parry Channel, and Lancaster 
Sound.45 The Plan identifies specific geographical priority areas and proposes 
tactics to protect these areas in the first 12-24 hours of a spill. The Plan provides 
very few details or recommendations for protecting the communities of Pond Inlet, 
Arctic Bay, Resolute, and Grise Fiord from an oil spill. The CCG cautions that the 
strategies identified in the plan are untested and require site visits and deployment 
exercises to confirm their viability.46 It is unclear whether the CCG has made any 
site visit or conducted any deployment exercises. 
The CCG has recently initiated an Area Response Planning Initiative, which aims to 
adopt a regional, risk-based preparedness and response system for ship-source oil 
pollution spills across Canada. The initiative is starting with pilot projects in four 
non-Arctic areas, seeking to identify how the oil response regime can be 
strengthened.47 Community based response plans in Nunavut could inform this 
process. 
Ships also have oil spill emergency plans. Under Canadian and international law, all 
tanker ships that are at least 150 GT and all other vessels that are at least 400 GT 
must have a Ship Oil Pollution Emergency Plan (SOPEP).48 A SOPEP outlines steps 
that must be taken if a ship-based spill occurs, including reporting procedures, 
authorities to be contacted, and actions to be taken by crew. Currently, SOPEPs are 
not Arctic-specific and therefore a SOPEP may not account for communications 
challenges that could arise in attempting to report a spill in the Arctic.49 The degree 
                                                 
43 Central and Arctic Regional Response Plan, p. 4-4. 
44 Id. 
45 Separate Area Plans have been created for the Kitikmeot and Keewatin Regions. 
46 Baffin Region, Nunavut Area Plan, p. 7. 
47 The pilot areas are the southern portion of British Columbia (BC);the St. Lawrence (Montréal to 
Anticosti Island) (QC); Port Hawkesbury and the Strait of Canso (NS); and 
Saint John and the Bay of Fundy (NB). 
48 Vessel Pollution and Dangerous Chemicals Regulations, SOR/2012-69, subsection 27(1); MARPOL 
annex 1. These requirements are codified in regulations under the Canada Shipping Act. 
49 However, the Polar Code now requires, “Operation in polar waters shall be taken into account, as 
appropriate, in the Oil Record Books, manuals and the shipboard oil pollution emergency plan or the 
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of planning outlined in a SOPEP is rudimentary, as it does not require the 
identification of where response equipment in or outside the region might come 
from, nor does it require planning for the response-related logistical issues that 
arise after the authorities are notified.  
Finally, oil handling facilities in the area have spill response plans.50 For example, 
the Mary River Mine has an Emergency and Spill Response Plan (ERP) and a Milne 
Port Oil Pollution and Emergency Plan (OPEP). The ERP addresses spills in areas 
outside the Milne Inlet Fuel Storage Facility and identifies on-site response training, 
including in marine spill response and shoreline recovery.51 The Milne Port OPEP 
addresses the specifics of response for the fuel storage facility and the bulk transfer 
of fuel, and describes shoreline and marine characteristics, spill scenarios and 
response strategies, planned training and spill exercises, and response equipment 
available at the port.52 These plans are based on a worst-case spill scenario that 
assumes a very small volume of fuel will spill during fuel transfer. Thus, the plans do 
not address response for higher amounts of fuel that could spill in the event of a 
breach of bunker or fuel carriage tanks. As a result, the on-site equipment is 
adequate for response only for a small spill. Although these plans provide detailed 
information about the coastline, the environmental resources, and priority areas, 
the information covers only the immediate Milne Inlet area and would not be helpful 
for a spill that took place elsewhere, such as near Pond Inlet, or that migrated from 
the source to other areas. 
Response standards 
Response standards establish concrete requirements for cleaning up a spill. In 
southern waters, to ensure the appropriate level of response equipment and 
personnel exist in the event of a spill, Canadian law requires ships to contract with a 
Response Organization that can provide equipment and personnel sufficient to 
clean up the amount of oil that a ship is carrying, up to 10,000 tonnes (t), within a 
                                                 
shipboard marine pollution emergency plan as required by MARPOL Annex I.” Part IIA, section 1.1.4. 
Thus, Canadian regulations may be updated to implement this provision. 
50 Canada Shipping Act, Regulations for Oil Handling Facility Standards, TP12402. 
51 Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation - Mary River Project Emergency Response and Spill Contingency 
Plan (Mar. 2013).  
52 Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation, Preliminary  Oil Pollution Em ergency Plan 
Marine Spills Appendix B.2, Milne Inlet Fuel Storage Facility. 
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certain amount of time.53 However, ships traveling north of 60 degrees latitude are 
exempt from these provisions.54  
The rationale for an absence of response standards in the Arctic is based on the 
lack of adequate funding, due to an insufficient number of ships that could 
contribute to the formation of an Arctic Response Organization. Perceptions about 
the relative risk of ship-based oils spills in the Arctic may also be limiting support for 
Arctic response standards. A TC commissioned risk assessment asserts that “the 
risk of oil spills in Canadian Arctic waters is significantly lower than in the rest of 
Canada as a result of low probability of spills, as determined by the lower level of 
traffic and low volumes of oil transported over the last 10 years.”55 Although the 
study incorporates an Environmental Sensitivity Index and a Human-Use Resource 
Index (HRI), the particular importance of subsistence in the health and wellbeing of 
northern communities was not considered. Instead, the HRI accounted only for 
commercial losses that would be caused by a spill.56 A Coastal Population Index 
was used as a proxy for subsistence values based on the assumption that non-
commercial hunting and fishing activities would increase commensurate with 
increased population densities.57 Yet this approach devalues the risks to individuals, 
especially those living in small communities who are heavily dependent on 
subsistence hunting. 
In addition, the study did not account for the heightened risks from navigation nor 
the heightened costs of spill response in the Arctic.58 Arctic conditions increase the 
probability of certain accidents. For example, capsizing and groundings are more 
probable due to topside icing and the lack of good charts and navigational aids. In 
addition, Arctic conditions increase the consequences of a spill because of the 
difficulty of response.59 
The CCG aims to maintain a national capacity to respond to a spill of 10,000 t 
through a collection of spill response equipment depots throughout the country. 
Although TC certifies that regional Response Organizations maintain the capacity to 
respond to ship-source oil spills of up to 10,000 t, similar procedures and criteria for 
                                                 
53 Canada Shipping Act, 2001, section 167(1); Environmental Response Arrangements Regulations, 
SOR/2008-275. For example, Response Organizations operating south of the Arctic must be able to 
deploy response equipment capable of responding to up to 1,000 tonnes of oil within 12 hours. 
Marine Safety Directorate, Transport Canada, Response Organization Standards, TP 12401 E, 
Section 3(2) (1995). 
54 Environmental Response Arrangements Regulations, SOR/2008-275, section 3. 
55 Risk Assessment for Marine Spills in Canadian Waters, Phase 2, Part B: Spills of Oil and Select 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances Transported in Bulk North of the 60th Parallel (WSP Canada Inc., 
2014), p. iii. 
56 Id., p. 11. 
57 Id., p. 16. 
58 Id., pp. 9, 60. 
59 Vard Marine Inc., Protection of Critically Sensitive Nunavut Marine Habitats, p. 74 (August 2016).  
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ensuring readiness are not in place for the CCG, and the federal government’s 
response capacity has not been estimated.60 The CCG is still building a national 
response capacity, and equipment requirements and placement are determined on 
an ad hoc regional basis.61  
The role of communities in response planning 
The importance of and need for Nunavut communities to be involved in response 
planning has been voiced from many corners. The NCLA emphasizes the 
importance of Inuit participation in decision-making, specifically noting, “there is a 
need for Inuit involvement in aspects of Arctic marine management . . .”62 Notably, 
a top priority of the current government of Canada is to consult and cooperate with 
Indigenous peoples in accordance with the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples.63  
The Tanker Safety Expert Panel recommended community engagement in the 
planning process, exercises, training, and other opportunities related to spill 
response.64 A report prepared for the NPC also recommended increased community 
input into spill response and preparedness, through, for example, local instruction in 
the operation and maintenance of response equipment and regular spill exercises.65 
Additionally, a recent report by the PEW Charitable Trusts and proceedings from 
meetings about the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors placed a priority 
emphasis on the importance of involving Aboriginal input in the planning of the 
Transportation Corridors.66 Thus, there is a strong mandate for communities to 
become more involved in oil spill response planning and protection of their 
shorelines and resources. 
IV.   Oil Spill Response Equipment, Personnel, Infrastructure, and 
Logistics 
A baseline assessment of the oil spill response equipment, infrastructure, logistics, 
and limitations to spill response in the region and within each community is 
                                                 
60 CESD Oil Spills from Ships, p. 22. 
61 Audit of The Canadian Coast Guard Environmental Response Services (Department of Fisheries 
and Oceans, 2010). 
62 NLCA Section 15.1.1. 
63 Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, “Statement by Prime Minister on release of the Final Report of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” (Dec. 15, 2015).  
64 A Review of Canada’s Ship-Source Spill Preparedness and Response: Setting the Course for the 
Future, Phase II, p. 29. 
65 Oil Spill Detection and Modeling in the Hudson and Davis Straits, p. 69.  
66 Dawson, J., et al., Proceedings of the Northern Marine Transportation Corridors Workshop 
(December 8, 2015). 
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essential for assessing existing capacity and identifying practical steps for 
improving local preparedness.  
Oil spill response equipment in the region 
The CCG is the primary source of spill response equipment in Nunavut, although 
community fuel storage facilities and the Mary River Mine also have some response 
equipment.  
The CCG has placed community packs in Resolute, Arctic Bay, and Pond Inlet, but 
not in Grise Fiord. These packs contain basic spill control equipment designed for 
use in near-shore areas and they can be used to clean up 1 t of oil during ice-free 
times.67 The packs include 1350-3650 feet of boom, an Elastec TDS-118 skimmer, 
a 16-foot aluminum boat, and an open top storage tank. The packs also include 
shoreline kits, which are comprised of rakes, shovels, pitch forks, sorbents, and 
tarps.68 
A fourth, and larger, equipment depot is in Iqaluit. Because of the size of this 
equipment, it cannot be transported by plane. Therefore, the equipment would be 
transported by barge or ship.69  
The condition of the equipment within the community packs and Iqaluit depot is 
unclear. Although the National Response Plan aims to maintain “a proper state of 
readiness through a pro-active approach using work orders and preventative 
maintenance,”70 the system for assuring the upkeep and maintenance of the 
equipment has not been consistent.71 For example, years after the Community Pack 
was placed in Iqaluit, the CCG had not conducted any critical maintenance.72 The 
Arctic environment renders mechanical equipment inoperable if it is not 
maintained, and therefore some of the equipment in the Community Packs may no 
longer be functional. In addition, essential ancillary equipment such as power 
packs, generators, and lights must be functional. 
Outside of Nunavut, additional oil spill resources are staged in Hay River, NWT.73 
This equipment could be transported by air to the community nearest to the spill 
site if conditions were favorable. Together with the equipment in a community pack 
                                                 
67 Canadian Coast Guard, Arctic Response Strategy, Presentation to Arctic Council Emergency 
Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Working Group (November 2009). 
68 Oil Spill Detection and Modeling in the Hudson and Davis Straits, p. 65.  
69 Central and Arctic Regional Response Plan, p. 5-13. 
70 Marine Spills Contingency Plan – National Chapter, p. 3-4.  
71 CESD Oil Spills from Ships, p. 21. 
72 Benoit, L., Perspectives on Emergency Response in the Canadian Arctic, Part C: Findings of the 
Hypothetical Scenario, p. 11.  
73 Central and Arctic Regional Response Plan, p. 5-12. 
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and the additional equipment in Iqaluit, this equipment is designed to recover a 
total of 1000 t of oil.  
The storage and disposal capacity of the equipment can also be a limiting factor. 
The equipment from Hay River can store a total of 240 t of fluids, which means that 
even if 1000 t or more of oil was recovered, there would be no place to store it. 
Additionally, some of this storage capacity will be used by water, because the liquid 
that is recovered is rarely 100% oil. 
If a CCG boat were in the region, it may be able to provide additional response 
equipment. Five to six CCG icebreakers are spread across the Arctic during the 
summer, with two or three typically covering the region outside of Quebec. Thus, 
only three icebreakers are responsible for the entire Northwest Passage. The CCG 
predicts that its icebreakers can be available to vessels needing icebreaking 
services in the Canadian Arctic within 10 hours.74 However, this time frame varies 
depending on ice conditions. Marine support can take multiple days if the weather 
and location of resources are unfavorable.75 In addition, because space on a vessel 
is at a premium, ships will not necessarily have oil spill response equipment on 
board.76  
The Eastern Canada Response Corporation is the certified Response Organization 
responsible for oil spill response in eastern Canada, south of 60 degrees. The 
Response Organization maintains response equipment in six locations along 
eastern Canada, the northern-most of which is St. John’s. Because there is no 
preexisting agreement for the equipment to be used for an out of region spill, the 
CCG and the corporation would have to reach an agreement before it could be used 
for response efforts in Nunavut. 
Trained personnel 
Another consideration for a marine oil spill response in Nunavut is the level of 
training and number of people who can use response equipment. Deployment of 
the equipment from Hay River requires 11 CCG and 16 community responders.77 To 
operate the equipment stored in Iqaluit, it would take 14 CCG employees, 13 
contractors, and 13 community responders.78 Yet, most communities have only one 
or two people who are trained to use oil spill response equipment. “This training is 
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often at a relatively basic level and with little opportunity for practice or maintaining 
the skills learned.”79 
The limited number of trained responders in Nunavut is due to a number of factors. 
First, because the communities are small, there are a limited number of people to 
draw upon. In addition, these people are not always available. If a spill occurred 
during subsistence harvesting times, for example, many people from the 
community would be absent. Second, people are reluctant to take spill response 
training courses without being compensated, but the government has limited funds 
to provide compensation and training.80 Third, when spills and training do not occur 
regularly, it is difficult to maintain skill levels.81 Communication and cultural barriers 
may also impede the successful implementation of training programs for local 
people.82 
The CCG anticipates that some community members could be trained on the spot,83 
but especially in small communities, it is unclear whether the CCG would be able to 
find enough people to train, how much time it would take, and whether response 
would be effective and safe if training occurred in this manner. As one federal 
employee living in the Arctic observed, “I think the question is how is this equipment 
going to be used and who is going to use it and how long will it take to use it.”84 
Depending on the number of people who were available in the community for ad 
hoc training, somewhere between 30-40 people with more expertise, including 
contractors and CCG employees, would still have to be flown in from outside the 
region and transported to the spill site to respond to a spill of 1000 t.  
The arrival of these responders would have a major impact on the community. Most 
ccommunities can only support 10-15 additional people at a time,85 although the 
ability of the community to support the responders would depend on the needs of 
the responders (such as accommodation, food, fuel, medical services, specialized or 
heavy equipment, local transportation, etc.).86 However, even providing sufficient 
food for the responders would be difficult because food supply is “just in time.” One 
Arctic resident explains, “You add a number of people into the community, you’ve 
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overwhelmed their ability to supply themselves with basic items . . . If we miss 
flights for two days, we’re on bread and water.”87 
Cascading resources for a spill of more than 1000 t 
As discussed in more detail below, a number of ships in the region have more than 
1000 t of fuel on board. However, there are no resources in the region to address 
spills greater than 1000 t. For larger spills, the National Response Plan relies on 
equipment that would be cascaded from other regional and national inventories. All 
of that equipment, along with the additional personnel needed to operate it, would 
have to be brought in from outside the region, either by air or by sea. The distance 
of Nunavut communities from larger population centers and the lack of 
infrastructure would make the cascading of people and equipment extremely 
challenging. 
Response and logistical concerns specific to each community 
The weather, population, infrastructure, coastline geography, and other logistical 
concerns for each community are also important constraints that must be 
considered in community response planning efforts.  
Pond Inlet88 
Pond Inlet is at the northern tip of Baffin Island on Eclipse Sound, around 60 
kilometres from the open water of Baffin Bay and adjacent to Bylot Island. Pond 
Inlet is the most populated of the four communities with 1668 inhabitants and a 
1200 metre gravel runway. Around 113 kilometres southwest of Pond Inlet, a deep-
water berth at Milne Inlet serves as the dock for the Mary River Mine. 
In the summer and fall, storms travel through Baffin Bay, bringing higher 
precipitation to Baffin Island. These storms also bring heavy winds offshore, 
although Pond Inlet is relatively protected from high winds. September and October 
also bring snow, which often restrict visibility. In Pond Inlet visibility is significantly 
impaired (less than 3 miles/5 kilometres or a ceiling under 1000 feet/300 metres) 
for nearly 20 percent of each day in fall.89 From mid-November to mid-January, 
visibility is further impaired by lack of any daylight, as the sun stays below the 
horizon.  
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The area has 3 – 4.5 metre tides and a continuous southward current of 1-2 knots, 
which carries ice floes into the inlet from Baffin Bay. Ice begins to form along the 
coast in September and does not melt until July. 
For Pond Inlet, the CCG Area Response Plan notes that the exposed, unprotected 
coast will challenge shoreline booming techniques for the sandy beach and tidal 
flats near the community, but recommends deploying 3000 feet (around 1000 
metres) of boom. The plan also notes the risk that southwest currents will carry ice 
and oil onto the shore. The plan explicitly states that shore-based operations are not 
to take place without consulting local residents. The plan identifies Sirmilik National 
Park and Bylot Island as areas that are important for wildlife, and recommends 
hazing by local hunters and helicopters to protect the wildlife from oil. The plan also 
notes that archaeological and historical sites are in the area, but does not identify 
their specific locations.  
Over a hundred kilometres to the southwest, the Baffinland Mine has oil spill 
response equipment, including an aluminum skiff boom, a skimmer, and storage 
drums.90 The ships carrying fuel to the mine also have spill response equipment on 
board, including boom and a skimmer.91 
Arctic Bay92 
Around 250 kilometres to the west of Pond Inlet, and also on Baffin Island, Arctic 
Bay is on a gravel beach in a protected area along Adams Sound, which feeds into 
Admiralty Inlet and then northwards to Lancaster Sound. Arctic Bay has a 
population of 817 and also has a 1220-metre gravel runway. 
Visibility is significantly impaired (less than 3 miles/5 kilometres or a ceiling under 
1000 feet/300 metres) during the summer and fall 30-45 percent of the time, and 
20-30 percent of the time during spring.93 Visibility is limited by the lack of any 
daylight between mid-November and mid-January. The sun is up continuously from 
the beginning of May until the beginning of August.  
Tides and currents in Arctic Bay are minimal. Sea-ice forms in September and 
doesn’t break up until July. 
For Arctic Bay, the CCG Area Response Plan notes that the mouth of the bay is too 
wide to use boom, but it recommends deploying the 3500 feet (1067 metres) of 
boom that is available there. The plan notes that there are archaeological sites at 
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Uluksan Point, but it does not otherwise identify important areas near the 
community.   
A deep-water berth exists near Arctic Bay at the Nanisivik Naval Facility, which is 
connected to the village by a gravel road. The dock from this decommissioned mine 
is now being refurbished as a Naval refueling station.  
The Nanisivik Naval Facility Spill Contingency Plan does not identify what spill 
response equipment will be available at the site, although the plan references the 
use of boom and skimmers.94 With respect to a vessel grounding or collision, the 
Emergency Response Plan states only that, “Individual ships will have their own 
emergency plan and standard operating procedures in the case of ship grounding or 
collision.”95 
Resolute96 
Across Lancaster Sound and nearly 400 kilometres northwest of Arctic Bay is 
Resolute, on the south coast of Cornwallis Island. The population is around 250. The 
town has a gravel runway that is around 2000 metres long, although the Royal 
Canadian Air Force is considering an expansion that would include a paved, 3000-
metre runway, hangars, and other infrastructure to serve as a base for search and 
rescue operations. The decommissioned Polaris mine, 100 kilometres northwest of 
Resolute, has a deep-water dock. 
Wind gusts in Resolute on most days are more than 30 kilometres per hour and 
often reach above 60 kilometres per hour. Most of the annual precipitation is snow 
in August, September, and October. The snow often restricts visibility. During the 
summer, low cloud and fog are the routine across ice-covered waterways and open 
water areas. Visibility is significantly impaired (less than 3 miles/5 kilometres or a 
ceiling under 1000 feet/300 metres) during the summer and fall 30-40 percent of 
the time, and 20-30 percent of the time during spring and winter.97 In Resolute, the 
sun goes down in the beginning of November and does not come up again until the 
beginning of February. 
For the community of Resolute, the CCG Area Response Plan notes that protection 
of the shoreline, which is extremely sensitive, could be affected by ice, depending 
on the direction of the wind. The plan also notes that the bay is too wide to protect 
with boom, but recommends deploying the 1500 metres of available boom. The 
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plan also notes the historical importance of Beechey Island, 80 kilometres east of 
Resolute, but does not otherwise identify important areas near the community.98 
Grise Fiord99 
Grise Fiord, one of the coldest and most isolated inhabited places in the world, is 
around 400 kilometres northeast of Resolute and around the same distance north 
of Arctic Bay, on Ellesmere Island. The community is situated on Jones Sound, more 
than 100 kilometres from Baffin Bay.  
The population is 150. The community has a short gravel airstrip that is 500 
metres. The airstrip is very difficult to approach and only experienced pilots flying 
small planes such as the DHC-6 Twin Otters are recommended.100 The CCG 
equipment from Hay River is not available due to the length of the runway. 
While the winds in Grise Fiord are generally light, they are very erratic and can 
include strong gusts, making conditions difficult to predict. Visibility is limited for 
10-15 percent of the time during the summer and is generally good through the rest 
of the year.101 The sun goes down in the beginning of November and does not come 
up again until mid February. 
Grise Fiord is surrounded by tidewater glaciers and loose ice or icebergs in the water 
throughout the open water season. A moderate current flows out of Jones Sound 
into Baffin Bay. 
For the community of Grise Fiord, the CCG Area Response Plan notes only that 
protection of the sand and gravel shore may be limited due to the presence of ice at 
any time and that the fjord is too deep and wide for booming techniques. The plan 
also notes the importance of Coburg Island, 100 kilometres southeast of Grise 
Fiord, to seabirds and recommends that local hunters and helicopters be used to 
haze the birds away from the oil. No other important areas are identified and no 
other available response tactics (besides shoreline clean up) are recommended. 
V. Factors that can limit response 
Even if a community has sufficient equipment and trained personnel, there are a 
number of factors that can limit an effective spill response, including how the oil 
changes and where it goes after it spills, the response methods and equipment that 
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is used, the available communications and transportation infrastructure, the time it 
takes to begin recovering oil after it has spilled, and weather conditions that may 
limit a response altogether.  
Oil spill behavior and oil spill response mechanisms 
The behavior of oil spilled in water influences how and whether the oil can be 
cleaned up. For example, the spreading and weathering of oil and whether it comes 
into contact with ice will significantly affect how and the extent to which it can be 
recovered. Most of the information about the behavior of oil spills in the Arctic is 
inferred from research in the lab, rather than field studies or actual oil spills. Thus, 
response planning is limited to some degree by a lack of information about the 
behavior of oil spilled in the Arctic.  
In addition, the equipment that is used to recover oil or protect the shoreline will not 
work as well in certain situations, such as where there are high winds, short period 
or high waves, limited visibility, or icy waters.  
A more in-depth discussion about what happens to oil when it spills in Arctic 
conditions, various options for removing spilled oil and minimizing its impacts, and 
trade-offs of different response methods are discussed in more detail in a second 
report, authored by Nuka Research, that is part of this WWF project. 
Transportation and communication infrastructure  
Transportation infrastructure can also limit the effectiveness of response efforts. In 
the event of a spill, response resources would need to be transported from storage 
depots to staging areas near the spill or the coastal resources to be protected. The 
lack of transportation infrastructure in Nunavut makes this a challenge. Bringing 
additional people and equipment into the community could be difficult, especially 
during the summer and fall when flights are often cancelled. Weather and sea ice 
could also limit the ability to transfer equipment and personnel by water from the 
nearest community to the spill site. Boats such as the 16-foot skiff accompanying 
the response equipment in Resolute, Pond Inlet, and Arctic Bay cannot travel in high 
winds or waves, nor can they travel for extended distances. During the fall, the sea 
can freeze quickly, making a response effort by boats that are not ice-capable very 
challenging. Extreme storms are also common during the fall, which would make 
response efforts dangerous or impossible. 
In addition, the ability for people to communicate between the spill site, the staging 
area where equipment is located, the nearest hamlet, and boats and aircraft in the 
area is also important. Reliable communications, sea and weather information, and 
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the ability to monitor the spill are essential components of oil spill response.102 
“Communications infrastructure of Canada’s Arctic communities is fragile and is 
heavily dependent on only a few centralized points, which decreases stability.”103 
Communication challenges could be a significant impediment to mounting and 
sustaining a response in any of the communities.104 
The nearest community to the spill location would serve as an important hub for the 
transfer of equipment and people, and the ability to communicate with that 
community would therefore be crucial.105 Yet, cellphone and internet networks can 
be quickly overwhelmed, slowing the speed of the internet, preventing phone calls, 
and potentially leading to a breakdown in proper emergency response protocol. For 
example, during an emergency exercise in Iqaluit in 2009, the influx of people in the 
community overloaded the local cellphone and internet networks, making it 
impossible to carry out the emergency protocol.106 
To access and recover the oil, it is necessary for responders to have information 
about safe maritime routes and conditions, including information regarding the 
presence of ice and weather conditions. This information must be transmitted by 
the limited communications infrastructure, and the “lack of access to bandwidth 
that permits timely downloading of live information aboard vessels is one of the 
issues currently facing navigators in the North.”107  
Once oil comes in contact with water, it will travel with currents and wind, and 
tracking the spill is therefore essential to being able to find the oil and recover it. 
The National Aerial Surveillance Program has one Dash 7 airplane, based in Ottawa, 
which could be used to monitor the spill as long as it is floating on the water 
surface.108 Other methods for monitoring a spill may also be available but would 
require additional planning and resources.  
Response time 
Response time is a critical factor in an oil spill response. As discussed above, 
Canadian law provides response times for different levels of spills that regional 
Response Organizations must be able to meet. However, these standards are fairly 
weak and do not apply to response capabilities in the Arctic. The CCG estimates 
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that it would take 48 hours to have equipment from Hay River on scene.109 By 
comparison, Response Organizations operating south of 60 degrees must be able to 
deploy the same level of response equipment (capable of responding to up to 150 t 
of oil) within six hours (although only at designated ports). Additionally, because 
more time could be necessary to fly the 27 or so people needed to operate the Hay 
River equipment into the region, and because delays due to weather are a very real 
possibility, the first response could be delayed even longer.  
It would likely take even longer for the equipment from Iqaluit to arrive. The CCG 
estimates a general timeframe of one week for deployment of the barge in Iqaluit 
to a spill site. However, this response time is a very general estimate provided for 
any of the 1000 t storage depots to any place in the Arctic.110 More specific 
estimates for how long it would take have not been made for each community, and 
this should be done for local response plans. By comparison, Response 
Organizations operating south of the Arctic must be able to deploy the same level of 
response equipment (capable of responding to up to 1000 t of oil) within 12 hours 
(although again, only at designated ports).111 Depending on where CCG boats were 
at the time of the spill, it could take days for the boat to reach the spill site. For 
example, during the grounding of the Clipper Adventurer in Coronation Gulf, it took 
four days for the first oil pollution response assistance to arrive.112 
Additional delays could occur once the people and equipment are staged in the 
nearest community. One resident explained that a response to an emergency can 
be jeopardized by the lack of snowmobiles, ATVs, boats and motors, gas and oil, 
which “greatly hampers our response time. We spend the time trying to find people 
to volunteer their equipment.”113 
Response time is critical because the more time that passes, the more the oil 
travels and spreads. This makes shoreline protection and recovery more difficult 
because there is a larger area that is covered in oil and the patches that are thick 
enough to be picked up by skimmers become smaller. As the spreading increases, 
weathering will also increase, making the oil more difficult to contain and recover. 
High winds and rough seas would make matters worse. In addition, the longer the 
response time, the greater chances of the oil stranding onshore or mixing with or 
migrating under ice.  
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Response gap  
Arctic conditions can make the recovery of oil spilled from a ship in the Arctic much 
more difficult but they can also completely preclude any response efforts at all. A 
“response gap” exists when activities that may cause an oil spill are conducted 
during times when an effective response cannot be achieved, either because 
technologies available will not be effective or because their deployment is 
precluded due to environmental conditions or other safety issues.114 
Environmental conditions that can prevent an attempted response include wave 
height, wind speed, air temperature, visibility, cloud ceiling, daylight, vessel 
superstructure icing, and ice coverage. For example, boom will only work in waves 
up to one metre high, or two metres if the waves are sufficiently spread out. Wind 
more than 15 metres per second will also make it impossible to contain the oil with 
boom. If visibility is less than one kilometre, it is extremely difficult to find and 
recover oil slicks, and no recovery can take place during darkness. If too much ice 
builds up on the boats or equipment, they will not be safe to operate.115  
A study commissioned by Canada’s National Energy Board assessed the response 
gap in West Central Canadian Davis Strait. The study found that during periods of 
open water, mechanical recovery would not be possible for 36 percent of the time in 
August, 48 percent of the time in September, 67 percent of the time in October, and 
95 percent of the time in November.116 The response gap assessment does not 
account for sea ice. Because there are many days throughout the season when ice 
coverage would preclude response, the response gap may actually be much 
greater.117  
Although the study examines the response gap in a location to the east of Lancaster 
Sound, the analysis provides a general picture of the difficultly responding to a spill 
in the region. Additional, location-specific response gap analyses should be 
performed for each community engaged in local response planning, because it may 
point to the need for additional mitigation measures, such as tugs or closed areas. 
VI.   Existing environmental and subsistence information and maps 
Maps that show details about important environmental resources, what the 
shoreline is made of, and how the shore can be accessed are important tools for a 
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community in deciding how and where it will focus its response efforts if there is an 
oil spill. Certain shoreline types are more sensitive to oil pollution, and in some 
areas in the Arctic these areas have been mapped. In addition, the physical features 
of the shoreline and surrounding area will affect how and whether a shore can be 
protected. 
There are various sources of information about the environmental resources in Grise 
Fiord, Pond Inlet, Resolute, and Arctic Bay, including maps identifying important 
areas. Although detailed coastal mapping for the Canadian Arctic is in progress, 
most maps are on a smaller scale (covering a large area) and identify only general 
areas of importance within and near each community. Many are not detailed or 
recent enough for community oil spill response planning purposes. The degree of 
community input in the creation of these maps varies, and is not always clearly 
stated. 
An ECCC project used video and satellite images of the coastline in six different 
Canadian Arctic areas to identify baseline coastal information from 2010-2012. 
Known as the Emergency Spatial Pre-SCAT for Arctic Coastal Ecosystems (eSPACE) 
project, it is intended to provide baseline mapping to support a range of coastal 
planning activities, including oil spill response and cleanup efforts. This information 
was used to create the Beaufort Regional Coastal Sensitivity Atlas. The atlas uses 
shoreline classifications, including the use of an Environmental Sensitivity Index, 
and provides clean up strategies for shoreline types.118 One of the other coastlines 
mapped by the eSPACE project includes Resolute Bay.119 However, this information 
has not yet been used to create an atlas. Because of the extensive length of the 
Canadian coastline, the eSPACE project is investigating methods to create an 
automated system that can general baseline maps without intensive human input 
and manipulation. 
The Government of Nunavut’s DOE conducted the Nunavut Coastal Resources 
Inventory (NCRI). Inventories of Arctic Bay (2010) and Grise Fiord (2014) were 
completed. According to a review of these coastal inventories, the NCRI maps 
provide detail on locations, timing, distribution, diversity, abundance, and migration 
routes for many specific species, as well as specific travel routes, archaeological 
sites, campsites, and hunting and fishing areas used by local Inuit.120 
Twenty-five years ago, the Nunavut Atlas was created to assist the Inuit in selecting 
the lands they would retain with the settlement of the Nunavut claim. Each section 
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contains an indexed map of the settlement area, maps illustrating and text 
describing land use and critical wildlife areas.121 However, this atlas does not 
appear to be available electronically. Because of the time that has passed since 
these maps were created, they may not be as relevant today. 
The NLUP process includes a variety of maps, some of which are on a large scale 
(close up) and include detailed community-specific information.122 For example, the 
summary of community meetings for each community include maps identifying 
environmental, cultural, and historical resources and areas with potential for 
sustainable economic development. Schedule A of the Draft NLUP is a map of the 
entire region identifying land use designations. Schedule B is a map of the entire 
region identifying valued ecosystem and socio-economic components. The options 
and recommendations include a set of large scale maps identifying, among other 
things, key birds habitat, caribou use areas, polar bear use areas, beluga calving 
grounds, sea ice features, existing and proposed protected areas, and historical 
areas. 123 These maps could help communities identify spill response priorities. 
The Pan Inuit Trails Atlas is a website-based map providing place names and trails 
throughout the Canadian Arctic. Place-names are linked to places of significance, 
and often denote important fishing and hunting areas and camps. The source maps 
can also be viewed through the atlas.124 
A partnership between Nunavut Youth Consulting, the Geomatics and Cartographic 
Research Centre at Carleton University, and Nunavut Arctic College has created an 
online atlas called the Cybercartographic Atlas of Arctic Bay. The atlas includes an 
interactive spoken map of Inuktitut place names in the Arctic Bay Region.125 
Project assessments for the Mary River Mine, developed by the project proponent, 
include fuel spill models with shoreline maps and information, but the detailed 
information is limited to Milne Inlet and does not extend as far as Eclipse Sound or 
Pond Inlet.126 The coastal sensitivity mapping for the project focuses on the 
proposed southern shipping route and relies on Environment Canada’s Arctic 
Environmental Sensitivity Atlas System (AESAS) for information about the northern 
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route.127 The AESAS includes shoreline sensitivity mapping in Lancaster Sound and 
was last updated by Environment Canada in 2000 or 2004.128  
On a smaller scale (covering a larger area), Fisheries and Oceans Canada compiled 
maps of ecologically and biologically significant areas in the eastern Arctic.129 Pond 
Inlet, Arctic Bay, and Resolute are all within and adjacent to Ecologically or 
Biologically Significant Marine Areas (EBSAs), and Grise Fiord is flanked by EBSAs 
as well. Fisheries and Oceans Canada also mapped important ecological and 
biological marine features based on local knowledge.130 These maps are helpful for 
a general overview but are not detailed enough for local response planning 
purposes. 
WWF recently commissioned a report by Vard Marine Incorporated to support the 
NLUP process, and this report identifies some important marine and coastal 
resources on a small scale.131 Because these maps cover a large area, they are also 
not very helpful for local response planning purposes.  
In addition, planning documents for the Nanisivik Naval Facility Project include 
maps identifying, on a smaller scale that spans all four communities, wildlife areas 
of special interest, polar bear, walrus, ringed seal, bearded seal and harp seal 
range, important bird areas, key marine habitat, narwhal, beluga whale, killer 
whale, and bowhead whale range, subsistence and commercial fish and shellfish 
harvest locations, and protected areas.132 Again, the large areas that these maps 
cover make them less helpful for community response planning. 
VII. Shipping in Nunavut 
Navigating in Nunavut waters is particularly risky due to the presence of sea ice, the 
low visibility from fog and from short daylight hours in the fall, and the lack of 
information and communication support for ships. Despite these risks, shipping 
activity in the Nunavut region is increasing. Most ship traffic is from adventure 
tourism, resource development, and community resupply, although some large 
vessels are now transiting the area in transarctic shipping. As the number and size 
of ships using Nunavut waters increases, the potential for spills and the 
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consequences of these spills also increases. During the NLUP meetings, Arctic Bay, 
Grise Fiord, Resolute, and Pond Inlet all expressed concerns about shipping.133 
Information and communication support for ships 
Safe navigation in Nunavut is challenging due to a number of factors. As described 
above, sea ice is present in Nunavut waters for most of the year. Even during 
periods of open water, sea ice, bergybits, growlers and icebergs are present, can be 
difficult to spot and can cause significant damage to a ship’s hull. 
Also, navigation is difficult because of the poor quality of charts. The Canadian 
Hydrographic Service (CHS) produces navigational charts for the region, which 
provide essential information to ships such as water depths and hazards. The CHS 
has incomplete hydrographic data for the Arctic, including the eastern part of the 
Northwest Passage and access to each of the four communities.134 The charts for 
the region are therefore not very detailed or accurate.135  
Information for ships about sea ice and weather is also limited, making navigation 
more difficult. The CCG Marine Communications and Traffic Services (MCTS) is 
based in Iqaluit, 1000 kilometres from Pond Inlet and 1500 kilometres from 
Resolute and Grise Fiord. A base in Resolute, which operates from mid-July to late 
October, provides ship to shore communications, radiofacsimile weather and ice 
charts, and information on wind and ice conditions in specific areas.136 In addition, 
ECCC’s Meteorological Service provides, on a seasonal basis, daily weather and ice 
information based on imagery from satellites. 
The Automatic Identification System (AIS) is an automatic tracking system used on 
ships and by vessel traffic services for identifying and locating vessels. AIS is an 
important tool for preventing ship-based spills because ships that are unexpectedly 
too close to shore or that appear to have lost power can be seen and a response 
can be activated to assist the ship before it runs aground. Information about a 
ship’s location can be transmitted to satellites or to shore-based stations. Where 
AIS shore-based coverage is incomplete or satellite coverage is spotty, ships cannot 
be tracked in real time, limiting the effectiveness of this tool. 
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Shipping trends in Nunavut 
Current shipping in the region consists mostly of passenger vessels (both entering 
and exiting the Canadian Arctic as part of a Northwest Passage, and larger cruise 
ships visiting the hamlets in the region), community resupply ships, tankers and 
general cargo vessels supporting the development of the Mary River mine, and 
government icebreakers.137  
Grise Fiord and Arctic Bay gets the fewest number of ships, with community 
resupply and small adventure ships being the main source of traffic. Ships traveling 
the Northwest Passage travel past Resolute, and may call on that community 
and/or Pond Inlet. Pond Inlet, with the additional ships from the Mary River Mine, 
gets the most ship traffic. 
During the 2013 open water season, there were 27 adventure and tourism voyages 
in the region, 12 of which were by passenger vessels (as opposed to smaller vessels 
such as yachts).138 In the fall of 2016, the first full-sized cruise ship transited the 
Northwest Passage through Lancaster Sound. Eight tankers and 14 cargo vessel 
voyages also traveled in Lancaster Sound in 2013.139 Also during the summer of 
2013, the Nordic Orion, a ship carrying coal from western Canada to Finland, 
became the first bulk carrier to transit the Northwest Passage.140 
The Mary River iron ore mine on Baffin Island, 155 kilometres south of Pond Inlet, is 
the only operating mine in the region. Ore is trucked from the mine to Milne Inlet, 
and then shipped through Eclipse Sound, passing Pond Inlet. The mine is operating 
year-round and stockpiling at Milne Inlet for shipping during the open water season. 
During the 2015 season, 13 voyages carried ore from Milne Inlet.141 Additional 
vessels carried fuel for the mine. 
Although Lancaster Sound has been identified as an area of high oil and gas 
potential, there is no exploration or production of hydrocarbons in the region. Until 
recently, Shell Oil held 30 exploration permits in the Sound, but has since 
relinquished them. 
Potential future growth in shipping 
As marine activity continues to expand in the Arctic, the potential risk of vessel 
accidents and oil spills also increases. Changing sea-ice conditions due to climate 
change, including calving of ice islands (from ice shelves) and more abundant small 
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icebergs, also make the region increasingly hazardous to navigate.142 Increased 
activity from passenger and re-supply vessels and natural resource projects is likely. 
The populations of Arctic Bay and Pond Inlet are projected to grow, which may lead 
to additional community resupply vessels.  
Shipping from the Mary River Mine is also likely to increase. The company has 
applied for an amendment to triple the amount of iron ore currently permitted (from 
4.2 to 12 million tonnes a year) and to extend the shipping season to 10 months a 
year.143 The company proposes to use two ice breaking Post Panamax ore carriers 
to extend the shipping season from June to March. These carriers will transfer the 
ore to other carriers in Nuuk during the winter and in Eclipse Sound, near Pond Inlet, 
during open water periods.144 “During the trans-shipment operation, up to five 
vessels will be active at the trans-shipment area in Eclipse Sound (one Cape size ore 
carrier, two purpose built self-discharging ore carriers, and two tugs). In addition, 
floating storage of fuel will be anchored nearby for refueling of the tugs.”145 The 
company anticipates 150 ore carrier voyages a year.146 As of October 2016, the 
environmental review process for the amendment had yet to begin. The increase in 
Mary River Mine ship traffic will result in increased traffic traveling past Pond Inlet. 
Although no other mines are operating in the area, there is ongoing exploration for 
diamonds and base metals. 
In addition, the Canadian government has started construction to refurbish a deep-
water dock and refueling facility in Nanisivik, 33 kilometres northeast of Arctic Bay, 
for use as a government refueling station from July to October. Two Arctic Offshore 
Patrol Ships are expected to use the station four to ten times per season. The 
facility may also be used to receive and distribute cargo from other government or 
commercial vessels. The facility is likely to result in some increase in ship traffic in 
Admiralty Inlet, near Arctic Bay, though how much this increase is remains to be 
seen. 
As information and response services are further developed along the corridor, the 
use of Lancaster Sound is likely to increase. For example, in the spring of 2016, the 
Chinese government published Northwest Passage shipping operating manual to 
support Chinese cargo vessels traveling from China to the Northeast coast of North 
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America.147 The CCG has begun the process of designating shipping corridors 
through the Northwest Passage. The initiative will identify routes within which key 
navigational information services will be prioritized, such as hydrography, 
icebreaking, and aids to navigation. The initiative identifies the route through 
Lancaster Sound as a primary corridor.148 The establishment of the corridors may 
lead to increased traffic, as part of the objective of establishing the corridors is to 
incentivize their use.149  
Potential spill volumes from ships near Pond Inlet, Arctic Bay, Resolute, and 
Grise Fiord 
Oil can spill from a vessel’s cargo (in the case of a tanker or barge) or its fuel tanks. 
Ships currently transporting hydrocarbons through the area carry refined petroleum 
products such as diesel, gasoline, and jet fuel.150 Currently, no ships carry crude oil 
through the region, although this could change if offshore hydrocarbon development 
takes place. 
The ships transiting Nunavut waters use a variety of fuel types for their own 
propulsion, with many of the larger commercial ships typically using heavy fuel oils 
(HFOs), which pose the greatest risk. HFOs are 50 times more toxic than medium 
and light crude oil spills and evaporate more slowly in cold environments such as 
the Arctic.151 Intermediate Fuel Oils (IFOs) are a blend of marine gas oil and heavy 
fuel oil and are also more toxic and evaporate more slowly than lighter oils. 
Chemical or product tankers, passenger vessels, bulk carriers, container vessels, 
and refrigerator container ships typically use HFOs and IFOs.152 Barring international 
agreement to ban HFO use in the Arctic, ship traffic fueled by HFOs and IFOs is likely 
to increase in Nunavut. In 2013, 23 ships made one or more voyage through 
Lancaster Sound using IFOs or HFOs.153 
Other vessels use arctic diesel fuel.154 Diesel is a more refined product than fuel 
oils, making it more likely to spread, evaporate, and dissolve. Diesel is a non-
persistent fuel, meaning that it tends to degrade more quickly than persistent oils 
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(fuel oils or crude oils).  However, diesel has a higher acute toxicity to animals, 
plants, and people when it is first released.  
The size of an oil spill could range from a few liters spilled by a small boat to 
thousands of tonnes of fuel spilled by tanker or a large commercial vessel.  
Fuel capacity for typical ships using Nunavut waters 
Bulk carriers and cruise ships are vessels currently operating in Nunavut waters 
using HFO/IFO, and they carry from 2000 to 3000 t of fuel. For example, the bulk 
carrier Nordic Orion, notable as the first bulk carrier transit of the Northwest 
Passage in 2014, carried around 2500 t of fuel.155 The Nordic Oshima, which serves 
the Mary River Mine and is similar to the other ore carriers serving the mine, is 
slightly larger with a fuel capacity of more than 2800 t.156 In 2014, the Nunavik, an 
ice-strengthened ore carrier, made the first unsupported trip from near Deception 
Bay, in Quebec’s Nunavik region, to northeastern China. The ship carried around 
2020 t of IFO.157 It is unclear how closely the ships transiting Lancaster Sound come 
to the coastline or to Nunavut villages. 
Typical dry cargo vessels (providing community resupply) currently in the Eastern 
Canadian Arctic probably carry less than 1000 t of fuel,158 but the average general 
cargo vessels carry around 2000 t of fuel.159 Thus, if larger vessels are used in the 
future to meet the demands of growing communities, the amount of fuel used by 
these vessels will be greater. 
The Crystal Serenity is a 68,870 GT cruise ship that travelled through Lancaster 
Sound and stopped in Pond Inlet during its cruise through the Northwest Passage in 
2016. The fuel capacity for this vessel is approximately 3085 t. The ship voluntarily 
ran on low sulfur fuel, although most large passenger ships do not, and can hold 
thousands of tonnes of HFOs.160 
Tankers carrying fuel to the Mary River Mine carry up to around 4500 t of diesel,161 
while community re-supply vessels carry up to around 18,000 t of fuel oil.162 
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However, the risk that these vessels will spill oil is reduced as a result of double 
hulls for tankers. 
In addition to increasing traffic, ships are using and will continue to use Nunavut 
waters for longer periods each year because the sea freezes over later each season. 
Ships are therefore in Nunavut in the fall, when daylight hours are quickly 
diminishing and reduced visibility becomes an additional risk factor. 
VIII. Conclusions 
A framework for local spill response planning should include a process for 
inventorying locally and regionally available resources and evaluating the 
capabilities and limits for responding to potential spills. The framework should 
evaluate equipment along with infrastructure and logistics, and should recommend 
options for filling gaps in preparedness.  
The communities of Pond Inlet, Resolute, Arctic Bay, and Grise Fiord are not 
prepared for a ship-based spill. As this report notes, Grise Fiord has no CCG-
stockpiled oil spill response equipment and the other three communities have 
equipment that could clean up only a very small amount of oil. Furthermore, the 
condition of this equipment is uncertain and not checked regularly. Although 
additional response equipment is stored in Hay River and Iqaluit, it is unclear how or 
whether that equipment could be used in the Nunavut communities. The distance of 
these communities from larger population centers and the lack of infrastructure 
would make the cascading of people and equipment extremely challenging. In 
addition, the weather could prevent the transport of equipment and people to the 
spill site. 
With only a few ships outfitted with minimal response equipment and spread out 
over a large area of the Canadian Arctic, the CCG is unlikely to reach a spill quickly 
or be able to clean up significant amount of oil. Moreover, there is no CCG process 
in place to ensure that sufficient equipment will ever exist in any of the villages to 
clean up the amount of oil that could spill from ships currently traveling in the 
region. The ships themselves are not required under Canadian law to carry their own 
spill response equipment or to have contracted response capacity in the Arctic. 
As a result, community response planning should begin with an assessment of the 
worst case discharge that is possible and the resulting equipment and people that 
would be needed to respond to this worst case scenario. Based on this 
understanding, the communities should also assess how and to what degree 
outside resources might assist in meeting these response needs by determining 
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how people and equipment could be brought into the area and how long the 
process would take. Because weather can limit the transport of equipment and 
people into town, weather limitations should be factored into the logistical analysis, 
such as by determining how likely it is that flights might be cancelled. 
Because of the significant limits of weather, communities should also conduct 
response gap analyses to get a better understanding of when and how long the 
periods are when no response would be possible. The limits to response are based 
not only on the operational constraint of equipment, but also on personnel health 
and safety. Air and water temperatures, combined with wind speed, determine 
whether it is safe for people to response to a spill and local response plans should 
incorporate this information. 
These analyses would help to provide a clearer picture of the limitations to response 
and could point to the need for strengthened prevention measures to address risks 
that cannot otherwise be addressed. 
The communities can also identify existing resources that could be developed and 
strengthened. For example, Nunavut’s PPD has some equipment and trained 
personnel, as does the Mary River Mine and possibly the Naval facility will as well. 
Communities can explore opportunities to work with the Nunavut PPD and project 
proponents to stockpile additional equipment and increase response training.   
In addition to a lack of response equipment, Nunavut communities do not have 
adequate response plans. The CCG area response plans for the communities 
provide very little information about how important resources should be protected 
and how fuel should be recovered. Therefore, communities can also support the 
development of local response plans by identifying priority areas for protection and 
ensuring that adequate maps and site specific strategies exist that can be used 
during an oil spill response.  
Local response plans can also assess the communications systems that would be 
available for response operations and be designed accordingly.  
A framework for local spill response planning should provide a mechanism for 
communities to work in partnership with other levels of government to assess and 
improve the existing regime. The framework should identify priorities and consider 
implementation pathways – which may include the need for legislative change – in 
order to achieve the goal of enhanced, community-based preparedness.  
Engagement by the communities in government permitting and planning processes 
may help the communities to gain support for local response planning efforts. The 
hamlets of Nunavut can consider priorities for protecting their resources from the 
impacts of a spill and identify the ways in which they’d like to be more involved in 
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federal response planning regime. These efforts can lead to support for community-
based response plans, which hamlets can seek to incorporate into existing and 
updated area plans.  
In addition, communities can seek support for stronger response capacity by 
advocating for changes to the regulatory regime, such as for provisions that would 
ensure each community has equipment to respond to a spill of a certain size 
(greater than the 1 t currently available in the community packs).  
A framework for local spill response planning should inventory available information 
and data and include a mechanism to incorporate local and traditional knowledge 
from risk assessment and planning through response and recovery. It should also 
include policy recommendations as they relate to community priorities for risk 
evaluation and spill response. 
The communities of Pond Inlet, Resolute, Arctic Bay, and Grise Fiord have 
community members with unique and critical knowledge of natural resources, local 
navigational conditions, and infrastructure/logistics that are valuable to oil spill 
contingency planning and response. This information should be incorporated into 
local response plans and inform policy recommendations related to federal 
planning efforts. 
In sum, by assessing existing resources, logistical considerations, community 
priorities, and response limits, Nunavut hamlets can identify how to increase their 
local response capabilities. This information can inform the development of local 
response plans, be incorporated into federal response planning efforts, and support 
advocacy for increased government support and improved response planning 
regulations.  
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